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L

ast October, a group of distinguished tax experts from
the European Union and the United States convened at
the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on
"Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme
Court and European Court of JusticeTax Jurisprudence."The
conference was sponsored by the Law School, the European
Union Center, and Harvard Law School's Fund for Tax and
Fiscal Research. Attendees from Europe included Michel
Aujean, the principal tax official at the EU Commission,
Servaas vanThie1, chief tax advisor to the EU Council, Michael
Lang (Vienna) and Kees van Raad (Leiden), who run the two
largest tax U.M.
on the European continent, and
many other distinguished guests. The U. S. contingent included
Michael Graetz of Yale Law School, Alvin Warren of Harvard
Law School,Walter Hellerstein of the University of Georgia
(widely recognized as the preeminent U. S. state tax scholar),
and other important academics. Michigan was represented
by Professors Kyle Logue and Daniel Halberstam of the Law
School, Jim Hines of the Economics Department, and myself as
conference organizer.
The impetus for the conference, the first of its kind, was a
series of decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
the last 20 years, but with increasing frequency in the last five.
In those decisions the ECJ interpreted the Treaty of Rome (the
"constitution" of the EU) aggressively to strike down numerous
member state income tax rules on the grounds that they were
discriminatory.-For example, the ECJ ruled that Finland cannot
grant tax credits for corporate tax paid to Finnish shareholders,
but refuse them to foreign shareholders. In another case, the
ECJ struck down Germany's rules that restricted the deductibility of interest to foreign lenders, even though the rules also
applied to tax-exempt domestic lenders. Other examples of
provisions struck down by the ECJ are:

a dividend tax credit granted to resident companies but
refused to the branch of a company having its seat in another
member state;
a refund of overpaid income tax granted to permanent
residents but refused to taxpayers moving to another member
state during the tax year;
personal reliefs granted to residents but refused to nonresidents even where they could not benefit from such reliefs in
their member state of residence;
a business relief (a tax deduction for transfers of funds to
a pension reserve) granted to residents but refused to nonresidents.
When we compare this line of cases to the U. S. Supreme
Court's treatment of state taxes under the U.S. Constitution
(most often under the Commerce Clause, but sometimes under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses), the difference is striking. In general, the Supreme Court has granted
wide leeway to the states to adopt any tax system they wish,
only striking down the most egregious cases of discrimination
against out of state residents.Thus, for example, the Court has
refused to intervene against rampant state tax competition to
attract business into the state. It has twice upheld a method of
calculating how much of a multinational enterprise's income
can be taxed by a state that is widely seen as both incompatible
with the methods used by the federal government and other
countries, and as potentially producing double taxation. And it
has allowed states to impose higher income taxes on importers
than on exporters through the use of so-called "single factor
sales formulas," under which a business pays tax to the state
only if it makes sales to residents of the state, but not if it makes
sales outside the state.
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On the face of it, this contrast is surprising. After all, the ECJ
is dealing with fully sovereign countries, and taxation is one of
the primary attributes of sovereignty. Moreover, the authority
of the ECJ to strike down member state direct taxes is unclear.
The Treaty of Rome generally reserves competence in direct
taxation to the member states, and all EU-wide changes in
direct taxation have to be approved unanimously by all 25
member states. Nevertheless, the ECJ has since the 1980s interpreted the "four freedoms" embodied in theTreaty of Rome
(free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital) to give
it the authority to strike down direct tax mqsures that it views
as incompatible with the freedoms.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has clear authority
under the Supremacy Clause to strike down state laws that are
incompatible with the Constitution. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed, the United States will not be hurt if the
power to review federal laws were taken away from the Court,
but it could not survive if the Court lost its power over state
legislation. Moreover, the states are not fully sovereign, and
(unlike member states that are represented in the EU Council),
are not even directly represented in Congress, so that the Court
could strike down their laws without (in most cases) expecting
an outcry from the other branches of the federal government.
What is the explanation for the contrast? Part of the reason
is that member state taxes in the EU are more important than
state taxes in the United States, because most taxes in the
United States are paid to the federal government, whereas all
taxes in the EU are paid to member states.Thus, even high tax
states like New York or California have income tax rates in the
low double digits, whereas member state tax rates a n reach 40
percent for corporations and 60 percent for individuals.
However, this cannot be the whole answer, because the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted its lenient attitude to state taxation
before there were federal taxes (the federal corporate tax only
began in 1909, and the federal income tax in 1913, long after
the states began taxing income). Instead, the answer lies in
m e r e n t conceptions of federalism.

In the United States, the country began as a loose (runfederation of sovereign states.The issue of state sovereignty'loomed
large in the formatidh of the constitution and tbereafter
through the Civil War, and the concept of state rights s$U j
)II
resonates strongly today. As a result, in the United States, feder;
alism means that the f e b l government should respect the
,,
sovereignty of the states as much as is compatible with the need
to have a unified country.Taxes are essential to.sovereignty,and
therefore the Supreme Court has always m e d a deferential attitude to state choices in m a t t e ~ o taxation,
f
even if it
resulted in some level of discriminati& against out of staters.
The Court intervenes only when the tax is blatantly discrirninatory, such as New Hampshire's attempt to adopt an income tax
only for non-residentswho commute into the state.
In the EU, on the other hand, there is no unified central
government, but there is a background of bitter wars between
sovereign states. As a result, there is a wish among some for
the creation of a "United States of Europe." That god has so
far proven elusive, but the focus of thefederalists has been
to advance it by enhancingthe economic union that underlay
the formation of the EU. ahus, the ECJ has taken the lead
in trying to create a meanin@ single market. It, and .the
EU Commission (which brings many of the tax cases before
the ECJ), see discrimhation h direct tax matters as a major
obstacle to the achievement of this goal. Ultimately, m y
observers feel that the ECJ is trying to force member state4 to
abandon the unanimity rdk for direct tax matters and even to
achieve direct tax harmonization, such as the hakionizatj~n
already used for indirect taxes (consumption taxes, such as VAT,
are harmonized in the EU by the Sixth Directive, adopted by
unanimous consent wh& the ELI was much smaller).
Given this divergence of political context, can the ECJ and
the Supreme Court learn s o m e ~ , f r o m
each other's tax juris~rudence?I believe the answer is yes, and that the conference
showed some of the lessons each can learn from the other.
For the U.S.Supreme Court, I believe the EU experience
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shows that it is sometimes too lenient in state tax matters. In
particular, permitting states to compete for the location of
investment by multinationals by granting tax incentives has
proven to be very costly for the states, while not bringing any
benefit to the United States as a whole (since the multinational
typically has decided to invest somewhere in the United States
already). Such tax competition creates a "race to the bottomsnin
which states only grant incentives to prevent the multinational
fiom going elsewhere, not because they believe the benefits of
the investment truly j u s q the cost in foregone tax revenue. In
Europe, such incentives are banned by the state aid provisions
of theTreaty of Rome, which are strictly interpreted by the
Commission and the ECJ to prohibit all tax incentives that are
targeted at particular taxpayers.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has just accepted a case
from Ohio that raises this issue directly. In 1998, the City of
Toledo granted DaimlerChrysler $280 million in tax incentives
to expand its factory there, rather than move it to Michigan
or elsewhere in the United States. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler held that such targeted
tax incentives violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. If the Supreme Court is willing to learn from the
ECJ in this regard, it should affirm that decision.
What about the ECJ learning from the Supreme Court? Here
as well, a recent decision illustrates a learning opportunity. In
Mark and Spencer, the issue was whether the UK is obligated to
allow losses incurred by Marks & Spencer's foreign subsidiaries
to offset income earned by the UK parent, because under UK
rules it can use losses by domestic subsidiaries to offset income
of the parent. The big difference, of course, is that the domestic
subsidiaries are subject to tax at the same rate as the parent,
while the foreign subsidiaries can be in Estonia, where there
is no corporate tax, or in Ireland, where the tax rate is only
12.5%. The ECJ ruled on December 13,2005, that the UK
must allow the loss offsets even though it cannot tax the foreign
subsidiaries.

It is widely believed that the ECJ ruled the w v it did in
order to force the political branches of the EU to move toward
corporate tax rate harmonization, as the Commission h
advocated (to no avail) for many years. But here the ECJ can
learn a lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court: Deciding cases in
order to force action by the legislature can be dangerous.
This rule can be illustrated by the Quill case, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1991.The case involved a question that had
confronted the Court before: Under what circumstances can
a state force retailers that sell into the state by remote means,
such as catalogues or (nowadays) via the Internet, to collect
the sales tax due on the purchases?The tax is clearly due, but
relying on the buyers to pay it voluntarily is hopeless, so collection by the remote vendor is the only practical way to enforce
the tax.
In 1967, the Court held that the vendor cannot be made
to collect the tax unless it had a physical presence (like a
warehouse) in the state, relying on both the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. Most observers
expected when the Court accepted the Quill case that it would
overturn that decision, given the phenomenal growth of the
remote sales industry between 1967 and 1991. Instead, the
Court held that the physical presence test still applies, but only
under the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process clause.
The reason the Court adopted this approach is clear:
Commerce Clause decisions can be changed by Congress
through simple legislation, since the Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states,
but Congress is powerless to overcome decisions under the Due
Process Clause. The Court thus expected Congress to intervene
and set rules under which states can force remote vendors to
collect sales taxes.
Fourteen years have passed, and Congress has not acted. The
reason is simple: The states are not represented in Congress, so
Congress cares more about the remote sales industry with its
~owerfullobbv than abo
tax revenues. In the meantime,

ofhw

Conference organizer and Law Pm@ssor Reuven Avi-Yonah chats with a
conference attendee above, and at right with potticipants~amesHines
of the University of Michigan's Ross hsiness School and Hugh ~ u of
d
Boston College Low School.

the Internet has sprung into existence, remote sales now top
$100billion per year, and state sales tax revenues are rapidly
shrinking.
The lesson for the ECJ is thus not to decide cases in the
expectation that the political branches will act. Many member
states are vehemently opposed to direct tax harmonization.
The UK, for example, is more likely to react to losing Marks
and Spencer b y abolishing its domestic loss offset rules than
by giving up on the unanimity requirement in direct taxes.
Thus, the lesson for the ECJ is that it should be more careful
about dismantling member states' income taxes, because such
decisions can have unexpected consequences.
More broadly, I believe comparing the U. k. and EU experiences shows that there is more than one way of constructing a
single market without tax distortions, and that some level of
distortion can be accepted.Thus,the U. S. Supreme Court can
&ord to be a bit more harsh without trampling down on state
sovereignty on tax matters, and the ECJ can afford to be more
lenient without aeating unacceptable barriers to trade and
investment within the EU.
I hope this conference is just the beginning of a series of
discussions between EU and U.S.tax experts on these issues. A
conference volume will be published next year, and a follow-up
conference is tentatively scheduled for 2007-by which time
we will ahso know how Cuno came out.

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, the Irwin I. Cohn Professor o f l a w and
director ofthe International 7bx LL. M. Program, ,specializes in international taxation and international la& and is widely published in
these subject areas. He blso served as consultant to the U S .Treasury
on tax competition and OECD on mx competition, and is a memb r
ofthe Steering Group ofthe OECD's International NctworkJok T
Research and ofthe Michigan Governor's Commission on
~ibunal
Rcform. Profcor Avi- Yonah ekned his B.A., summa cum laude,jom \\
Hebrew University and then earned three degreesfiom Harvard: an
A.M. in history, a Ph. D. in history, and a J D., m a p a cum laude,jom
Harvard Law School. Avi-Yonuh has been a v i s i t q p r o f c o r $law
at the University ofMichigan, NewYbrk Uwersity, and the University
ofPennrylvania. He has also served as an dssistant professor oflaw at
Harvard and as an assistant professor ofhistory at Boston College. In
addition, he has practiced law with Milbank, Tweed, H a d l y &McCloy,
Ne'wYork; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen U a t z , NewYork; and Ropes &Gray,
Boston. His teaching interestrfocus on various apccu oftaxation and
international law, on the origins and development ofthe corporateform,
and on China and globajization.
31

